Salience and Polarization of Experimental Modules
The five experiments in the paper assess Congress' capacity to erode public support for unilateral action across three policy areas -President Obama's Clean Power Plan, which directed the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions as a greenhouse gas; his unilateral airstrikes against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria; and his presidential memoranda to cap student loan payments. The complete wording for each experiment is presented in SI Appendix 1. These three examples of important unilateral actions in the contemporary polity were chosen to vary in terms of substance, salience, and the extent to which they polarized the public. All three actions meet common thresholds to determine "significant" executive actions (e.g. Howell 2005 lower payments for some borrowers, the ultimate policy impact of the action by many assessments is rather modest.
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The three underlying issues these actions were intended to address -climate change, the threat posed by ISIS, and student loan debt -also varied significantly in terms of salience. Of the three, the ISIS threat was the most salient at the time of the relevant experiment. In the year preceding the first ISIS experiment, the New York Times ran more than 2,000 articles mentioning the Islamic state. 4 By contrast, during the same period only 159 articles mentioned student loan debt. In the year preceding the 2014 CCES, on which the first EPA experiment was embedded, the Times ran 982 articles mentioning climate change, and 335 that also included "carbon" as a key word. Systematically assessing the media salience accorded to the respective unilateral actions themselves is difficult, particularly regarding the unilateral strikes against ISIS.
However, additional text searches show that the New York Times ran 91 articles mentioning Obama, the EPA, and regulation in the year before the 2014 CCES. By contrast, the Times ran only 39 articles connecting Obama and student loans in the year preceding that experiment. Public opinion polling on the issues Americans consider most important also suggest that ISIS was the most salient issue, followed by the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions, and then student loan debt relief. Although taken almost a year after our first ISIS experiment was in the Finally, the three issues also varied considerably in the extent to which they polarized opinion along partisan lines. While the ISIS strikes were the most salient of our unilateral actions, extant polling data suggests they were also the least polarizing. For example, a whereas Republicans were more split on the issue, with 43% supporting such efforts and 56% opposing them.
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As a result, we believe that our observed treatment effects are likely generalizable to a range of substantively meaningful executive actions that vary in terms of the salience of the policy issue they address and the degree to which that issue polarizes the public. One limitation of our design, however, is that our results cannot speak to Congress' capacity (or inability) to influence public opinion toward much less insignificant executive actions that are unlikely to attract much public or media scrutiny. We argue that, in such cases, congressional challenges are perhaps doubly unlikely, first because the policy stakes are low, and second because members will logically anticipate the difficulty in activating public interest on relatively insignificant executive actions.
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Experimental Prompts and Treatments to Maximize External Validity
To maximize external validity, the wording of our experimental prompts and treatments was adapted from actual language used by political actors themselves and in media coverage of the executive actions. In both EPA experiments, we first tell all subjects that: "President Obama has directed the EPA to begin regulating carbon dioxide from coal power plants to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, combat climate change, and improve public health." The three main 12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this last possibility.
benefits of the action articulated by the administration in this prompt are taken directly from the president's own press release announcing the EPA memorandum.
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The policy criticisms treatment provided a counter-perspective that the proposed executive action "will increase energy prices and cost jobs." These were two of the most The student loan experiment -which consciously investigated Congress' capacity to lower support for an executive action that was mostly uncontroversial and non-polarizingattracted little negative scrutiny in Congress. However, the constitutional treatment is based on widespread media coverage of congressional efforts, most led by Republicans, to fight back against President Obama's unilateral actions in the courts and by publicly proclaiming their unconstitutionality. As an American citizen, I respect, honor and abide by our Constitution. Violating it is a major offense and a significant problem for this president. Not only is Mr. Obama's lack of congressional authority for war unconstitutional, the war also is not in our best interest. Our country is in the midst of an economic crisis, and we do not have the funds to subsidize the rest of the world. Because of our ever-increasing deficit, our current expansive foreign policies are no longer fiscally possible to sustain. Protecting and rebuilding other nations should not be our priority -our first loyalty should belong to America. Because logistic regressions are nonlinear models, the estimated effect of a change in a given variable on the dependent variable is conditional on the values of all other variables in the model. In Figure 1 in the text, we illustrate the effect of the congressional constitutional objection and policy criticism treatments on the probability of supporting the EPA executive action for the median respondent who does not believe that addressing global warming is an important priority. SI Figure 1 presents an identical plot illustrating the effect of the two treatments for subjects who do believe that addressing global warming is an urgent government priority. Among this subgroup, the baseline predicted probability of supporting the EPA action is much higher (.89 vs. .45). However, even among this group, both congressional treatments significantly lowered the predicted probability of backing Obama's action, by .10 and .11
respectively.
Robustness Check: Beliefs About Global Warming
To determine whether congressional criticism depressed support for Obama's EPA action even among those with pro-environmental policy preferences required some measure of each subject's predisposition toward the EPA regulating carbon dioxide emissions as a greenhouse gas. To provide such a measure, before our experiment on the 2014 CCES we asked all subjects a question that was taken from the common content of the 2013 CCES. Specifically, this question asked, "From what you know about global climate change or global warming, which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion?" Subjects were then asked to choose from an array of options ranging from "Global climate change is not occurring; this is not a real issue," to "Global climate change has been established as a serious problem, and immediate action is necessary." From this, we created a binary variable coded 1 for those respondents selecting the last option as well as the next in the scale, "there is enough evidence that climate change is taking place and some action should be taken" and 0 for those who did not believe the U.S. needs to take action to address global warming. As shown in the text, subjects' attitudes toward global warming were strong and significant predictors of support for Obama's EPA action. However, congressional opposition to the action decreased a subject's probability of supporting the EPA action, even after controlling for his or her policy preferences regarding global warming. Moreover, we found no evidence that congressional opposition only influenced attitudes among those who did not believe global warming an urgent problem requiring government action.
As a final robustness check, we re-estimate the base model in column 1 of Table 1 without the global warming variable. As shown in SI Table 2 , the coefficients for both the constitutional objections and policy criticism variables remain negative and statistically significant.
Robustness Check: Controlling for Presidential Approval
Prior to our EPA experiment embedded on the 2014 CCES, the common content asked subjects to indicate their degree of approval or disapproval of President Obama's job performance on a four-point likert scale. Because subjects were randomly assigned to the treatment and control groups, there should not be significant differences in the share of subjects approving or disapproving of the president across the groups that would bias our estimate of the constitutional and policy criticism treatment effects. However, as a robustness check, we reestimated all of the models in Table 1 in the text controlling for each subject's answer to the Obama approval question. SI Table 3 presents the results. As we would expect, overall presidential approval was a strong and significant predictor of support for unilateral action in the EPA context. The relevant coefficient is positive and statistically significant. However, even after including this additional control, we continue to find evidence that both the congressional constitutional objections and policy criticism treatments significantly eroded support for executive action. The coefficients are both negative, of almost the same magnitude as those reported in Table 1 in the text, and statistically significant. Moreover, when controlling for presidential approval, we continue to find no significant evidence that either treatment effect is moderated by either subjects' prior attitudes toward global warming or their levels of political knowledge.
Robustness Check: Ordered Logit Regressions
For all of the models in the text, we collapsed the "strongly support" and "somewhat support" categories to create a binary dependent variable coded 1 if the subject somewhat or strongly supported the president's unilateral action and 0 if she somewhat or strongly opposed the unilateral action. All of the models in the text are logistic regressions.
As a robustness check, we re-estimate all of the models presented in the text as ordered logit regressions using support for the unilateral action on the original four-point likert scale.
The results are presented in SI Tables 4-7 . Across all model, results are virtually identical to those from the logit models with a binary version of the dependent variable reported in the text.
Robustness Check: Political Knowledge as a Moderating Factor
In model 3 of Table 1 (reproduced in SI Table 8 below), we examined whether political knowledge moderated the effect of our congressional opposition treatments. To examine this possibility, we used a series of six questions on the 2014 CCES that afford a measure of political knowledge. These questions include knowledge of which party controlled the U.S. House of Representatives; which party controlled the U.S. Senate; and the partisan affiliation of each subject's home state governor, two U.S. Senators, and local representative in the U.S. House.
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We then re-estimated model 1 of Table 1 Alleviating such fears, neither of the political knowledge interactions were statistically significant. The coefficient on the constitutional objects X knowledge interaction is substantively almost zero, and highly insignificant. The coefficient on the policy criticism treatment X knowledge interaction is positive, but it fails to reach conventional thresholds of statistical significance (p = .08). Nevertheless, SI Figure 2 illustrates the substantive size of the interactive effect between political knowledge and each treatment for the median respondent. In terms of the policy criticism treatment, we see that at low levels of information the gap between the predicted probability of supporting Obama's EPA action in the control and treatment group is quite large. This gap, which illustrates the treatment effect, narrows somewhat as levels of political knowledge increase; however, only at the most extreme end of the knowledge distribution does the gap narrowly miss conventional levels of statistical significance. Only for the small percentage of subjects who answered all six knowledge questions directly does the 95% confidence interval for support in the treatment group include the point estimate for those in the control group. In terms of the constitutional objection treatment, the estimated probability of supporting executive action in the control group is outside the 95% confidence interval for the predicting in the constitutional objections treatment group at all levels of political knowledge.
There is a significant difference between the treatment and control groups regardless of the level of political knowledge.
Robustness Check: Effect of Partisan Opposition Across Partisan Groups
Finally, we examine whether the influence of the Democratic and Republican congressional challenges to the President's unilateral action were conditional on the partisan orientation of the subject receiving the cue. To do this, we re-estimated our logistic regression model from Table 4 with interaction variables for each treatment with the Democratic dummy variable. For a Democratic respondent, Republican members of Congress are not a trusted source. Similarly, Republican criticism of President Obama is not a "costly" signal. 25 As a result, the Republican challenge may be less influential on Democratic respondents than on Republicans or independents. By contrast, Democratic criticism of a co-partisan president is a costly signal that may be influential to Americans of all partisan stripes. SI Table 9 presents the results.
The coefficients for the main effects of both congressional treatments remain strongly Obama's unilateral action by approximately .11. However, the difference in effect size is not statistically significant.
In sum, we find little evidence that the influence of partisan congressional challenges to a unilateral action is limited to certain subsets of the public. Rather congressional challenges to unilateral action from either party appear to be meaningful to the public across party lines.
These results stand in stark contrast to other political assessments where opinion formation is dominated by partisan forces; public evaluations of unilateral action appear uniquely responsive to institutional challenges, regardless of the partisanship of the actors confronting the executive. 
Global warming Predicted Probability of Supporting Executive Action
Note: The horizontal line at .89 represents the predicted probability of the median independent respondent in the control group who believes in global warming supporting Obama's use of executive action to regulate carbon dioxide emissions. Dots present the point estimate for each factor; I-bars around each point estimate present 95% confidence intervals obtained from simulations. For the seven dummy variables, the figure plots the effect of increasing that factor from 0 to 1. For education and age, the figure presents the effect of a two standard deviation increase from the median value.
SI Figure 2: Moderating Influence of Political Knowledge on Effect of Treatments, EPA Experiment
Policy Criticism
Constitutional Objections
Note: The solid line plots the predicted probability of the median subject who does not believe in global warming supporting Obama's EPA action as political knowledge increases. The dashed line plots the predicted probability for the median subject in the treatment group. I-bars illustrate 95% confidence intervals.
SI Figure 3: Effects of Partisan Congressional Challenges on Support for EPA Action
Note: Each dot presents the estimated change in predicted probability of supporting Obama's EPA action from the control group; I-bars around each point estimate present 95% confidence intervals obtained from simulations. The top two figures illustrate the effect of each partisan challenge for the median independent. The bottom two figures illustrate the effect for the median Democrat. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups.
Control:
President Obama has directed the EPA to begin regulating carbon dioxide from coal power plants to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, combat climate change, and improve public health.
Constitutional Objections Treatment:
Many members of Congress from both parties, however, oppose the President's decision. They argue that President Obama's actions have overstepped his constitutional authority and that a major change in energy policy requires new legislation from Congress.
Policy Criticism Treatment:
Many members of Congress from both parties, however, oppose the President's decision. They argue that Obama's actions will increase energy prices and cost jobs.
Question:
Do you approve or disapprove of President Obama taking unilateral action to reduce carbon dioxide emissions?
Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
Two Presidencies Experiments: Unilateral Strikes Against ISIS
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups.
Control:
As you may know, President Barack Obama has unilaterally launched a series of airstrikes against ISIS militants in Iraq and Syria.
Constitutional Objections Treatment:
Many members of Congress from both parties, however, oppose the President's decision. They argue that President Obama has overstepped his constitutional authority and that military action requires authorization from Congress.
Question:
Do you support or oppose President Obama's decision to unilaterally launch airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria?
Two Presidencies Experiments: Student Loans
Control:
President Barack Obama has issued an executive order to unilaterally cap student loan payments at 10% of a borrower's income, and forgive any remaining debt after 20 years.
Constitutional Objections Treatment:
Many members of Congress from both parties, however, oppose the President's decision. They argue that President Obama's actions have overstepped his constitutional authority, and that a major change in student loan policies requires new legislation from Congress.
Question:
Do you support or oppose President Obama's decision to unilaterally lower student loan payments?
Source Effects Experiment: Unilateral Strikes Against ISIS
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of five experimental groups.
Control:
Congress Treatment:
Many members of Congress from both parties, however, oppose the President's decision. They argue that President Obama has overstepped his constitutional authority.
President Obama rejects this criticism and maintains that his actions are consistent with his constitutional authority as commander in chief.
Law Professors Treatment:
Many law professors at the nation's top universities, however, oppose the President's decision. They argue that President Obama has overstepped his constitutional authority.
Media Treatment:
Many newspaper editorial boards, talk radio hosts, and cable news pundits, however, oppose the President's decision. They argue that President Obama has overstepped his constitutional authority.
Congress Expanded Treatment:
President Obama rejects this criticism and maintains that his actions are consistent with his constitutional authority as commander in chief. 
